Operators: service-pipes or bit-pipes ?
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In the last five years, tier-1 mobile network operators (MNOs) have looked for strategic inspiration in many places, albeit with limited success: at the killer app, the killer brand, the killer supermarket, the killer segmentation, the killer branded handset, the killer content and the killer service. All have been results of the operator-is-king mentality, which followed from the astonishing revenue growth reaped by networks in the early years of mobile. All have come far short of expectations.
My thesis is that operators should re-evaluate their strategies, not in the context of the one-sided market, but in the context of a two-sided market, where value flows both from the left and right of the chain. In other words, rather than continue the one-firm-provides-all strategy, they should adopt a platform strategy, by linking users with content providers and advertisers. They should take lessons from Google, VISA, Microsoft, Shell, Monster and shopping malls. MNOs should focus on extracting value only where they can add value, i.e. through network, handset and retail enablers.
Let me explain, starting with a short history of how operators have tried to run the show so far.
The killer app
The buzzword of the telecoms-bubble era was the killer app. What was it? Email, chat, TV, IMS, mobile broadband (I still find the term amusing!) ? Nobody knew and nobody ever found out – the killer app turned out to be a bubble in itself.
The killer supermarket
Operators then tried the ‘killer supermarket’ recipe. The idea was that you could get customers to pay just for walking around the supermarket and browsing the shelves. Oh, and when you wanted to go across the street a guard at the door said: “Sorry, you can walk within our beautiful gardens, but you can’t go out. Don’t you remember ? You agreed to these terms when you walked in”. Within these gardens, operators dreamed that they could open up a bank, utility services and all the shops that the consumer would ever need. Tier-1 MNOs had to stop dreaming when the golden era of GSM growth started to dry and so was funding for blue sky projects. Walled gardens, too had to open after journalists did not spare any flattery with the whole garden business.
The killer brand
One of the most memorable milestones in mobile operator history was around 2002 when most tier-1 MNOs got jealous of Orange’s success and thought they should have national colours and buy lots of paint buckets to dress up their portals, handsets and everything else. Thus came Vodafone’s Red, O2’s Blue, T-mobile’s Magenta and Sprint’s Yellow. The colours did have a memorable effect on the consumer, but they lacked a memorable deliverable.
When the brand deliverables are not clear or relevant to the consumer (what does an MNO brand stand for?), there is little tangible differentiation to the eyes of the consumer, other than price. What does Vodafone Live! mean today to the average consumer ? Sergio Zyman (ex CMO, Coca Cola) wrote an entire book to express the point that marketing and promotion fails if it promotes the brand for the brand’s sake. As he puts it ‘in the absence of [brand] relevance, consumers always fall back on price’.
The killer segmentation
Since 2004, operators invested in building more and more sophisticated marketing segmentation plans. Most tier-1 MNOs today have about 10 segments (including business users), as shown in the case of T-Mobile below.

However, MNOs eventually had to realise that their organisations were built to run networks, not targeted marketing campaigns (the smartest MNOs like KPN moved into the wholesale business). The one-brand-fits-all approach was found to pale in comparison to the focused, niche segmentation of other manufacturers such as Nokia (with 50+ segments), SonyEricsson (see Cybershot and Walkman ranges) and 100s of high-street brands with niche and relevant brand propositions that enjoy loyal fan clubs. These companies built their brands through money, years of promotions and smart marketers.
The killer content
It was then that operators realised they needed Disney, MTV and Ferrari to get their users excited. However, content licensing turned out to be expensive (from 20M to license Disney content for a major operator, to nearly $100M to build ESPN Mobile, which as we all know went the way of the dodo).
The killer handset
What if operators could be making their own handsets ? Surely they would deliver the best handset for their own consumer segments, they thought. Vodafone decided to walk down this path and assembled a fine team to produce the Simply range. Vodafone’s Simply proposition, comprising of handsets, customer service and dedicated calling plan, was designed for a consumer segment the operator calls ‘adult personal users’. However, according to reliable sources, Vodafone country operations are today struggling to sell Simply handsets, because the range is competing unfavourably with other handsets in terms of price. Here’s another lesson: operators don’t know how to sell handset propositions, but manufacturers do. So much for the killer handset notion.
The killer service
We ‘ve heard it again and again. At 3GSM 04 the killer service was 3G. At 3GSM 05 it was HSDPA. At 3GSM 06 it was Mobile TV. All have come and gone, but still 80-90% of data revenues are driven by SMS in most western markets. In most cases, operators who have licensed DoCoMo’s i-mode solution have been able to convert at best 10% of their subscriber base. A new tariff and marketing plan stands to make much more revenue for the operator than x (insert a large number) billions spent on upgrading the network and handsets for next-generation services.
So where to next ?
From product to platform strategy
I would argue that tier-1 operators need to go back to square one and reconsider their long-term strategies. Starting from first principles, operators should extract value where they can add value. Beyond the voice and data transport network, there are two other things that operators do well: handset customisation and retail shops. However, these should be seen not as products, but as platforms.
My thesis is that MNOs should look into the mirror and realise that the market is not one-sided, as in the traditional manufacturing business, where revenue flows from right to left. MNOs should understand that they are part of a two-sided market, where buyers are on both sides of the value-chain equation and value flows from both the left and right. Two-sided markets have been successfully exploited by credit card companies (VISA, who links consumers to merchants), operating systems (Microsoft, who links PC users to application developers), internet search (Google, who links surfers to advertisers), recruitment (Monster, who links job hunters to employers), fuel(Shell, who links gas stations to car owners) and shopping malls (who link shoppers to retailers). Two-sided market concepts and strategies are the subject of the article “Strategies for Two-Sided Markets” by Eisenmann, Parker and Van Alstyne appearing in the October 06 issue of the Harvard Business Review (and well worth a read in my opinion).
In this context, operators should realise that they should act as the platform that links consumers with service providers and advertisers. This in essence is a three-sided market, where value flows from, and to, all three sides. Rather than try to be the manufacturing point for all goods, operators should extract value by adopting a platform strategy.
I have been thinking about this topic since my early strategy days at Orange. All in all, I believe MNOs should focus their platform strategies three pillars:
Pillar 1: Focus on Voice
Voice is the quintessential mobile service, revenue and profit-wise. Operators should own and manage voice services, but also provide peripheral data services related to voice. Examples are T-Mobile’s My Faves, Comverse’s visual voicemail, SnapIn’s self-service and SKT’s avatar-based videotelephony service).
Pillar 2: Develop Platform, not Product Strategies
Operators should realise that consumer service innovation most often comes from 3rd party service developers (and as Bill Joy says, the smartest guys work for someone else). Operators should develop platforms that link service providers with advertisers and consumers (and do it faster than Yahoo, Google and Nokia) – in other words be service pipes, to avoid being bit pipes.
MNOs can develop platforms that expose network, device customisation and retail enablers as follows:
- Network, location, subscription and device management APIs on the network side
- on-device portals and on-device electronic service guides that act as an accessibility/discoverablity portals for 3rd party services across all handsets.
- offer service promotion through retail stores – here operators win doubly by reselling services and selling retail space.
Operators should offer these platform constituents to all service providers (big and small), all advertisers and all consumers, and let the killer app, brand, supermarket, segmentation, branded handset, content and service be figured out by someone else.
Pillar 3: Develop brand deliverables that make sense to the consumer
If MNOs want to to be ranked more favourably within the list of handset purchase criteria, they should refocus on developing clear and sustainable brand deliverables that are relevant to the consumer, namely:
- offer choice. This can be choice of latest handsets, choice of home-screens or themes, choice of third party brand, service provider, etc
- offer peace of mind. Good examples are Orange’s Signature Premium package and Telefonica’s use of FOTA as an assurance of instant handset fix)
- offer convenience, i.e. allow users to visually check their balance, or how much a particular service will cost, check their voicemail, request upgrades, manage their subscription,etc.
In in all, operators should become platforms or service pipes, before they degrade to being bit pipes.
Thoughts and rants are welcome.
I couldn’t agree more with all you’ve written in the article. Especially about the two-side markets, i’ve think about it for a long time, just know the term now after read your article.
You said that operator is the one who has to do that, develop a platform. How if another party try to do develop platform (in order to connect/link the two sides) ? what they have to take concern ? from my opinion, billing is one of the main issue.
While it is uncommon to see written what you have writen, that is we don’t see it all pulled together so often, it is the same or at least is a subset of DoCoMo’s i-mode strategy of 1997 1998 launched in 1999. In fact while DoCoMo is a play on a Japanese word it was crafted from English meaning Do Communications and was all about communications and voice as key drivers, even though i-mode is also the most successful data service in the world (and an open platform and a complete symbiotic business ecosystem).
As for advising MNOs to think of themselves as 2-sided platforms/markets the book Invisible Engines by Evans, Hagiu and Schmalensee devotes an entire chapter to this analysis. They also devote an entire chapter to explain 2-sided markets which is the most boring chapter in the book. And as you say perhaps three-sided is more apt, which is just to say that 2-sided markets are just an academic fad replacing the perfectly adequate channel and value chain analyses which sensible people applied well in the past.
Walter Adamson
Melbourne, Australia.
R.A.B,
Thanks. I happened to read the HBR article on two-sided markets while I was putting together the service-pipe vs bit-pipe article – that’s synchronicity. With regards to your question, billing is one of the main features of an off-portal platform (see Bango). Nokia (among others) is already putting together platforms that connect users with content providers and in the future advertisers – see Nokia’s Content Discoverer, the evolution of Preminet.
Walter,
It’s true that DoCoMo has been practicing a ’service-pipe’ or platform strategy from the very beginning (and it’s flattering to know that my thesis is close to what was DoCoMo’s strategy in 1997!). I think European/US operator should adopt a somewhat different platform strategy, given the importance of voice and media (rather than information) to consumers in these markets today. Great pointer about the book – it’s going into my Amazon wishlist
Andreas
Great post, I agree completely. But I don’t agree with the earlier comment that this is NTT DoCoMo’s strategy.
From day one DoCoMo has insisted that i-mode itself is the portal and blocked content providers (CPs) from aggregating content themselves. CPs are also limited to one billing model, subscription, and their revenue from each service is capped at 300 yen per month.
Some consequences of this:
1. Once they have built a large audience CPs have no incentive to add new content and features to existing services, because they cannot raise prices. (Competition forces them to do so, but that becomes a race to stand still.) Companies like For-Side, Index, and Yahoo must launch new standalone services and market them independently, without linking to them. This is clearly much less efficient.
2. The market for mobile games is much less mature than in the US or Europe because you can’t sell one game one time, and you can’t profitably provide a selection of high-end games (as opposed to say Shockwave Minis) for just 300 yen per month.
3. DoCoMo keeps opportunities like full-track downloads to itself.
DoCoMo deserves a lot of praise, but this is not the fully open platform that you are describing. Mobile data revenues have begun to flatten out and I believe this half-open garden approach is to blame.
BTW my information may be a year out of date; I was running a subsidiary of Japanese CP For-Side up to that time. But even if DoCoMo has adopted an open platform, it did so in 2005 or 2006, not in 1997.
Jason,
OK, so DoCoMo’s 300 yen per month (per user?) revenue cap was new to me. This does create a ceiling for CPs, but at the same time it allows for a healthy, competitive market place where new entrant CPs have a good chance of success.
DoCoMo’s service-pipe strategy is also evident in the use of the DoJa platform to enable Standby (idle screen) plugins, that turn out to be a very powerful way for CPs to customise the phone (in what I consider to be a model for operator handset customisation).
DoCoMo has also practiced a relatively open strategy to CPs, which rewards the several thousand CPs which make it into the portal, with access to special network and device APIs, again a model in building CP relationships and trust IMO.
All in all, I accept that DoCoMo has practiced heavy-handed tactics in CP revenue models and revenue cap, but it otherwise is a service-pipe role model for Western MNOs (or as close as you can get to a model under open market conditions). Wouldn’t you agree ?
Andreas
Hello Andreas,
very interesting article! I’ve been thinking along similar lines on the current trend of MNOs getting into the DSL business. To me this combination could be worth a lot to them if they figure out their place as a service pipe and integrator for fixed/mobile services other companies can’t offer. I’ve discussed this in a somewhat shorter and less detailed aritcle on my blog: http://mobilesociety.typepad.com/mobile_life/2006/11/opportunities_f.html
Best regards,
Martin
Andreas,
There is nothing healthy about an arbitrary revenue cap; it is just market-distorting. Do you think that the market for new cars would be healthier if the government capped the price of a car?
Here’s a one-line summary of the Japanese mobile content market:
All of the money came from ringtones; now polys are widely available for free and there’s not enough margin in real music tones for CPs to compete.
(Source). Or look at the stock charts for the market leaders Index (ticker 4835), Cybird (4823), and For-Side (2330). (Bloomberg.com offers Japanese stock quotes and charts for free.)
There are two conclusions: (a) we’re all kidding ourselves, there is no future in mobile content or (b) DoCoMo has not created enough value for CPs.
I vote (b).
The restricted billing model means that the mobile games market in Japan is a fraction of the size of the market in Europe and the US, even though mobile internet penetration is far, far higher.
Nobody makes money in off-deck content because DoCoMo offers no off-deck billing model akin to premium SMS.
No premium SMS means no money in interactive TV, SMS marketing, or SMS communities.
There is no money for CPs in full-track song downloads because DoCoMo insists on controlling that.
The mobile advertising market is stunted because a joint venture of DoCoMo and Dentsu has a virtual monopoly.
Yes there are horoscopes and weather forecasts and news and sports content and even sales of perfume, but once you let people go off-deck, which you must, all of that is available for free.
At this point in 2006 most US and European MNOs offer CPs far more ways to make money than DoCoMo does. They just charge too high a revenue share. (Technology fragmentation also holds the market back, but in this respect Japan is no different than the US or Europe since DoCoMo, KDDI, and Softbank use different technologies.)
Finally, let me repeat that your article is excellent and that I agree completely. I just don’t agree that DoCoMo is the poster child.
Jason
Excellent piece. I had similar thoughts on carrier business looking from the mobile advertising prism.
best,
Chetan
Jason,
Having read the Wireless Watch article you point at (a great historical overview, by the way), I ‘m wondering if there is a third (c) conclusion in addition to the list of your earlier two. I.e.
(c) DoCoMo restricted the market for CPs and when they had to open up to flat-rate pricing due to KDDI competition, they left all their CPs stranded in a restrictive business model, unable to compete with the off-portal ringtone providers.
In which case I think I agree with you that DoCoMo was too heavy handed and not offering enough ‘openness’ and a broad-enough variety of revenue models (e.g. premium SMS, advertising, etc) that would let CPs innovate and survive against the ‘flat’ competitive landscape. BTW, in Europe operators opened premium SMS up to third parties mostly as an afterthought, and not as a premeditated strategy IMO.
In conclusion, my view would be that DoCoMo probably is a practical role model for service-pipes in opening up the network and handsets to CPs, but NOT in they way that strategy was executed.
Andreas
I agree with that. Let’s put it this way; for both sides of the market – consumers and CPs – DoCoMo’s mobile data service at launch was better than any service in the US or Europe *at launch*. But looking at the subsequent evolution of the market in all three areas, I think the US and Europe have caught up and in some respects overtaken Japan. All of the positive changes in the US and Europe were afterthoughts as you put it, and DoCoMo didn’t afterthink enough.
BTW, the point of my post this week is that none of this should surprise us. That’s not because the MNOs are ’slow’ or ‘dumb’. It’s because the direct revenue from mobile content will never be enough to matter to them, unless voice revenue collapses completely. The primary value of mobile content to the MNOs is that it allows them to sell more voice minutes, by winning consumers away from other MNOs. Creating the best possible environment for CPs is actually bad for them, because it would quickly lower the bar for CPs to executing across all operators at the same time.
I love to see Carriers as Bit Pipes. I hate to see them becoming service pipes. As a User, I am sick of ‘dont mind, we can lobby’, ‘we dictate what you need’ attitude. Recent Verizon YouTube announcement just affirms. Verizon is to choose what video I am gonna watch. Come on.
Why I Love To See Carriers As Bit-Pipes? (http://mobile.inspions.net/2006/12/03/why-i-love-to-see-carriers-as-bit-pipes /)
visionmobile 2005-2010


